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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS ANDREWS
The above entitled cases which all involve the same group
of wells and springs in Juab County were consolidated for
trial. The appellants, Orvil Andrews, N eldon V. Andrews,
R. Delos Andrews, Eldon V erness Andrews, Oral Calvert
Taylor and Laveda A. Taylor, collectively herein referred to
as nAndrews," have appealed from the amended decree of
the District Court of Juab County as it affects all three cases.
The plaintiffs in Case No. 3770 will be referred to as the
nFowkes" and the Current Creek Irrigation Company, plaintiff
in one case and defendant in each of the others, will be referred to as the ''Irrigation Company." Reference to the large
transcript will- be indicated (R. -). Other references will
specifically designate the document.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Andrews are the owners of what is commonly known
as the Starr Ranch, consisting of some 2500 acres of land
located a few miles north of Mona, Utah, of which 323 acres
are cultivated and irrigated, approximately 200 acres are in
irrigated and sub-irrigated pasture and the remainder in grazing land. This land lies east of the Mona Reservoir on both
sides of Highway 91. The Andrews are the owners of the
well and water rights described in the following claims and
applications:

4
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Flow or Water
Production

Claim

Priority

. . . . .:.>37 flowing well
'·)38 flowing well

Prior to 1915
Prior to 1915

20 gpm.
20 gpm.

. )39 flowing well
..)40 flowing well
. .)41 flowing well

Prior to 1915
Prior to 1915
Prior to 1915

300 gpm.
225 gpm.
20 gpm.

Use

Exhibit

stockwatering
stockwatering
and domestic
irrigation
irrigation
stockwatering
and domestic

No .

,.,,,,,;.,

A25
A25
A25
A25

Application
21443
::::::::::i

March 14, 1950

6

irrigation

A26

(This is the pump well referred to in the testimony.)
21444

March 14, 1950

6

irrigation

A26

(This application has been approved but well has not been
drilled.)
The flowing wells are located several hundred feet apart
along the west side of state highway 91 immediately north of
the Andrews dwelling house, and the pump well is located
approximately 1;2 mile in a southeasterly direction from the
southernmost well.
The Andrews are also the owners of a spring located west
of the home which prior to 1955 flowed approximately 2¥2
second feet. The water from the spring and the flowing wells
was used to irrigate 150 acres of land west of the state highway
in 1954 and in preceding years. The Andrews also own the
right to use water from numerous seeps and springs in the
lower meadow land for the irrigation of some 90 acres of
pasture land. It was ~tipulated that they and their predecessors
have used the spring and other springs and seeps since prior
to 1903.
5
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The Fowkes, whose land is located along the state highway
immediately north of the Andrews land, are the owners of
flowing wells represented by water claims 3096, 3097, 3098,
3099, 3108, 3109, 4392, 4393, 10470, 10471 and 10472, all
of which are in evidence (Pltf. Ex. 1). In addition they claim
the right to seeps, springs and sub-irrigation water for pasture
lands. It was stipulated that the use of this water antedated
1903. The wells were used for domestic purposes and for the
irrigation of approximately 115 acres of land.
The Irrigation Company owns Mona Reservoir and the
following wells which are located on the Andrews property
immediately east of the reservoir.

Well
No
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Priority

Date Drilled

1951
1951
1951
1951
1951

June 6, 1951
August 6, 1951
August 15, 1954
December 3, 1954
December 24, 1954

Depth & Size
of Casing
730
580
505
643
510

feet- 6
feet-12
feet-12
feet-12
feet-12

inches
inches
inches
inches
inches

All of the Irrigation Company's underground water rights
involved in these suits are based on application 22760 filed in
the State Engineer's office on April 9, 1951 to appropriate 18
second feet of water from three wells to be drilled in Sections
17 and 18, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, SLB&M. Wells
Nos. 1 and 2 were drilled to a depth of 730 feet and 580
feet, respectively. The yield of the two wells was disappointing to the applicant, (R. 161) and on November 18, 1953,
the Irrigation Company filed application No. a-2786 to change
the points of diversion fron1 the points of diversion described
in the original application (none of which were used) to five

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i1

I

points of diversion in Sections 8, 17 and 18, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, SLB&M. As indicated above three wells,
being Nos. 3, 4, and 5, were drilled pursuant to the change
application in 1954. This change application was approved
in 1956 by the state engineer and actions for review were filed
by both Andrews and Fowkes and are included in this litigation.
On April 7, 1951, two days before filing its underground
water application mentioned above, officers of the Irrigation
Cornpany entered into a written agreement with John W.
Roundy, Sr., and Mina Roundy, his wife, predecessors in
interest of Andrews, by the terms of which the Roundys
granted to the Irrigation Company the right to drill and maintain one or more artesian wells in designated quarter sections
west of the Union Pacific right-of-way, and the right to construct an open ditch from each of the wells to the Mona Reservoir. The consideration for the grant was the right to use
water from each well at times when the reservoir was full or
nearly so.
On June 25, 1951, the same parties entered into another
agreement the same as the first, except that it provided for the
drilling of the wells in the SW14 of Section 8, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, instead of in Sections 17 and 18 of the
same Township as provided in the contract of April 7th. These
agreements are designated "Pit£' s Ex. C and D", and were
received in evidence in case No. 3763.
The Irrigation Company drilled two wells designated Nos.
1 and 2 in June and August, 1951, pursuant to the agreements
set out above but at different locations than those authorized
in the agreements. The wells were permitted to flow con7
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tinuously, winter and summer, from 1951, when they were
drilled until 1955, when they were temporarily closed for
experimental purposes.
The well referred to above, and in the record, as the
ccAndrews Pump Well," with a priority of 1950, was drilled
in 1951 and was pumped each summer for irrigation purposes
thereafter (R. 245-246). It produced approximately six second
feet. According to the testimony of Mr. Roundy, the continuous
flowing of the two Irrigation Company wells and the summer
operation of his large pump well for irrigation of land east
of the highway and at a higher elevation than the large spring
near the house, and the Andrews and Fowkes flowing wells,
did not adversely affect the flows of such spring and wells.
In fact, he said that ~he irrigation of the higher land increased
their flows (R. 244-248).
On November 2, 1953, the Irrigation Company made a
third contract with the Roundys, similar in form to the previous
two contracts, except that it contained a new paragraph as
follows:
''It is known and understood by the parties hereto
that the parties of the first part have fl~wing we~ls ~£
their own on adjoining property and desue to mamtam
the present flow from said wells if possibl~ to do so.
It is not known "Thether or not the "Tells "yhtch may be
dug or driven pursuant to the authority of this ~gree
ment will affect the flo"T fron1 the "Tells heretn referred to and now O\vned by first parties. THEREFO~,
it is further specifically agreed bet,veen the parties
hereto that if, after the drilling or driving of any well
authorized by this agreement, the flow in any one or
more of first parties' "rells is diminished, each party
8
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hereto will choose a competent engineer and the two
so chosen will, with the assistance of the Utah State
Engineer, determine or have a determination made as
to whether the driving and using of any well authorized hereby has affected or diminished the flow in
first parties' wells. In the event it should be so determined that the flow in first parties' wells has been
diminished by any well drilled or driven under authority of this agreement, said three engineers will asssess
an amount of damages which in their opinion first
parties have suffered or will suffer by reason thereof,
and second party will then pay such damages to first
parties, or in the alternative will immediately cap and
discontinue
the use of any such well so drilled here,,
under.
The third contract also designated additional areas where
one or more wells could be drilled. See De£' s Ex. 1, Case No.
3763.
Pursuant to this third contract, the Irrigation Company
drilled Well No. 3 in August, 1954, and Wells Nos. 4 and
5, in December 1954. The wells produced a large flow of water
and were permitted to flow without interruption during the
winter of 1954-55 and spring of 1955. It will be noted by an
examination of Pit£. Ex. P. 13 these wells are perforated to get
water from nearly every water bearing strata. The effect of the
flow of these three wells was immediately noticeable (R. 249) .
The flows of the Andrews wells got smaller each time they
were checked and the South well stopped flowing entirely in
February. The next one to the North stopped npretty close
to the 1st of March" (R. 249). In the latter part of May, 1955,
the last of the Andrews flowing wells stopped flowing (R. 264).
None of the wells flowed again up to the time of trial (R.

9
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265) · The large spring near the house gradually diminished
in flow during the spring and summer of 1955, and it stopped
flowing entirely in the latter part of July (R. 266) (Tr. Case
No. 3763, pp. 16-17).
The Andrews operated their pump on the 5th and 6th
of July, 1955, and then closed down until about July 24th;
from which date they pumped without much interruption until
the fall (R. 268).
During the period from November, 1955, to June, 1956,
the state engineer and the U. S. Geological Survey made a
study to determine whether there was any direct relationship
between the Irrigation Company wells, the Andrews pump
well and the flowing wells along Highway 91. Many measurements were made, and the results of opening and closing the
wells are shown graphically on Pltfs' Exhibits 6A, 6B and
P8. See testimony of Mr. Mayo for the details (R. 30-31)
(Tr. Case No. 3763, pp. 20-46). The pumping of the Andrews
well and the flowing of the Irrigation Company wells lowers
the pressure in the flowing wells.
In the summer of 1956, the Andrews spring was dry, the
flowing wells were dry and the Andre\\·s pasture was drying up.
The Andrews thereupon closed the Irrigation Company wells
and notified the Irrigation Con1pany officials to keep the company wells closed or to par danlages as provided by the 195 3
agreement (Tr. Case No. 376.1. pp. 9-12).
Irrigation Con1 puny z·. Orz,il Andreu's-Case No. 3763.

In July, 1956, the Irrigation Con1pany filed Civil Action
No. 5763 alleging that Orvil Andrews had unlawfully closed
10
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their wells and would keep them closed unless the court entered
an order permanently enjoining him from molesting the wells
and from interfering with their operation and maintenance by
the plaintiff. After a hearing on an order to show cause, the
trial court granted an injunction pendente lite upon the posting
of a surety bond in the amount of $2500.00 and the Irrigation
Company wells were permitted to flow.
An amended complaint was filed thereafter, joining all
of the appellants. An answer was filed denying the material
allegations of the complaint and pleading the agreement dated
November 2, 1953, between the Roundys and the Irrigation
Company, the offer of the defendants to comply with the
paragraph quoted above, the selection of an engineer and the
demand that the plaintiff do likewise. The answer also alleged,
among other things, that the Andrews had prior water rights
in the underground basin which had been impaired by the
drilling and operation of the plaintiff's wells.

Andrews v. Irrigation Company-Case No. 3768
The Irrigation Company application No. 22760, under
which its wells were drilled, sought to appropriate 18 second
feet of water from underground sources. The points of diversion described in paragraph 7 are in Sections 17 and 18. After
two wells were drilled and the flow was found to be below
expectations, the Irrigation Company filed application No.
a-2786 to change the points of diversion to five points therein
described, some of which are closer to the Andrews wells
and nearer the mountains (Pltfs.' Ex. B). The change application was protested by Fowkes and Andrews but was approved
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the state engineer, subject to existing rights, more than one
year after the 1rrigation Company wells were drilled. The

f
I

i

Andrews filed this suit under Section 73-3-14, U.C ...A.... 1953,
to review the decision of the state engineer.

Fowkes v. Irrigation Company, Andrews, Utah Water and
Power Board, and the State Engineer-Case No. 3770
This suit was filed to enjoin the Irrigation Company and
the Andrews from further diverting water by means of their
respective wells or from interfering with the Fowkes' <(underground water sources of supply," and to recover actual and
punitive damages. A third cause of action is for review of the
decision of the state engineer approving Change Application
No. a-2786.
The Andrews filed an answer to the complaint alleging
that the interference with the Fowkes wells was caused by
excessive and wrongful diversions by the Irrigation Company.
They also filed a cross-claim against the Irrigation Company
seeking ( 1) an adjudication of the water rights of all parties,

( 2) injunctive relief, ( 3) administrative action to prevent further interference, and ( 4) damages.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND DECREE
The findings of fact describe generally the water rights
of the various litigants and establish relative priorities as
follows:

12
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~

1

First Priority
Second Priority
Third Priority
Fourth Priority

Springs
Flowing Wells
Andrews Applications
Irrigation Company Application

This is followed by findings as to the protesting of the
Irrigation Company change application No. a-2786, amending
its application No. 22760.
The following important findings are quoted:
((12. That the drilling and use of water from the
Andrews pump well and from the Irrigation Company
wells have interferred with and have interrupted the
flow of water from the eighteen flowing wells described
in paragraph three hereof and the springs described
in paragraph six hereof and have reduced the pressure
in said flowing wells and in said springs to the point
that effective future use thereof will require the installation of pumps or other means ot securing the
water therefrom.
13. That there is unappropriated water within the
area and that the action of the State Engineer in approving the Andrews Applications Nos. 21443 and
21444 and the Irrigation Company's Applications Nos.
22760 and a-2786 was proper and that the statutory
requirements of approval were complied with by the
applicants in each instance.
15. That Andrews has failed to sustain the burden of
proof to show the net effect of the interference caused
to his flowing wells and spring by the Irrigation Company as opposed to and distinguished from the effect
caused by his own pump well; and that Andrews has
failed to show any measurable intereference between
the Irrigation Company wells and his pump well.
17. That all matters as to administration and distribution of water are by statute vested in the State En-

13
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''-!.

gineer and no one has the right or the authority to
underta~e to open or to close any well without the
express permission of the said State Engineer.''
Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court concluded
( 1) that in Case No. 3763 the Irrigation Company was entitled to a decree enjoining the Andrews from in any way
interfering with its wells; (2) that in Case No. 3768, the Irrigation Company was entitled to a decree affirming the action
of the state engineer in approving Application No. 22760
and Change Application No. a-2768 and (3) that in Case
No. 3770, the Fowkes are entitled to a decree requiring the
defendants in that case to replace to Fowkes, during the
irrigation season, 1.775 second feet of water at their wells
·'on the surface of the ground'' and sufficient water at their
springs to irrigate 10 acres of land, and we quote, "that such
replacement of water shall be undiminished in quantity and
quality for the purpose heretofore used and the cost of such

replacement shall be borne equally by the Irrigation Company
and Andrews ... n (emphasis added). Replacement of 27.11
gallons per minute \vas ordered during the non-irrigation
season.
The Court then concluded that the Fo\Ykes \Vere entitled
to a decree enjoining the Irrigation Company and Andrews
from diverting or using \Yater under their respective applications from and after April L 1957. ~~unless and until replacement of water is made as ordered . . . "

It Jhould be noted that tbe court nzade no finding U'hattlJeJ' reJf'ccting tbf! u·rilh'JJ ugreeJJh'lltJ betu·een the Roundys
and the Irrigt~lion CoJnpt111J' (Defs Ex. L Case No. 3763),
14
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the performance of the agreements by the Roundys, and the
violation thereof by the Irrigation Company. The Court also
ignored the fact that the Andrews spring had a first priority
and that all Andrews rights were prior to the Irrigation
Company wells in making its order requiring replacement.
These omissions, which are of vital concern to the Andrews,
will be discussed at length under appropriate headings.
The decree follows the conclusions practically verbatim.

STATEMENT OF POINTS

Irrigation Company v. Andrews-No. 3763
1. The Court failed to make findings on all material

tssues.
a. The Court made no findings respecting the Roundy
contracts requiring the Irrigation Company to pay damages or
close its wells in the event of interference with the Andrews

wells.
b.· 'The Court ignored the plain provisions of the 1953
Roundy contract respecting the method of determining interference and fixing damages.
2. The Court erred in holding that the Andrews had the

burden of proof of interference with their prior rights.
3. The Court erred in making finding of fact No. 15 that
the Andrews had failed to sustain the burden of proof to
show interference with their spring and flowing wells.
15
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Andrews v. Irrigation Company-No. 3768
1. The Court failed to make findings of fact on the only

material issue in the case, namely, as to whether the approval
of Change li.pplication No. a-2786 would impair the Andrews
water rights.
2. The evidence shows the proposed change impairs
vested rights, and therefore Change Application No. a-2786
should be rejected.

Fowkes v. Irrigation Company-No. 3770
1. The Court ignored Andrews legal rights established

by contract.
2. The Court disregarded the Andrews priority, and in
time of shortage refused to order the Irrigation Company
wells closed.
3. The burden \Yas on the Irrigation Company to show
that its \Yells did not dry up the springs and \veils of the prior
users.
4. The Court erred in making finding No. 15 that the
Irrigation Con1pany \Yells have not measurably interfered with
the Andre,vs springs and \veils.
5. The Court erred in striking testimony as to the wastefulness of the Irrigation Company's use of \\'ater.
6. The Court's nsolution" to the problern presented was
arbitrary, incon1plete and "rholly ineffectual.
16
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ARGUMENT
ilit:

:4ff

~~~

'':~
~·'

iw

Irrigation Company v. Andrews, No. 3763

I. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF
FACT ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES.
The principal issue in this case was whether the Andrews
had unlawfully closed the Irrigation Company wells, all of
which are located on the Andrews land. This issue was raised
by the answer to the amended complaint in which the contracts
between Roundy and the Irrigation Company, Exhibits 1, C
and D in Case No. 3763 were pleaded. Particular reference
is made to the contract dated November 2, 1953, (Def's. Ex.
1) which as stated above provides that if after the drilling
or driving of any well authorized by this agreement, the flow
in any one or more of First Parties' wells (Andrews wells)
is diminished each party will choose an engineer and the two
chosen with the assistance of the Utah state engineer would
determine the question of interference and assess the damages.
The contract then provides:
and the Second Party will then pay such damages to First Parties, or in the alternative will immediately cap and discontinue the use of any such well
drilled thereunder.''
(C

•••

It is then pleaded in the answer that the Andrews had
offered to name an engineer and to otherwise comply with
the provisions of the agreement referred to above, and had
demanded that the Irrigation Company do likewise. The Irrigation Company refused to comply.
The material issue as to the right of the Irrigation Company to operate its flowing wells in violation of the 195 3
contract was entirely disregarded by the Court. No findings

17
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of fact were made on the subject. This was reversible error.
In the case of Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673, the
Court said:
celt .is ~he duty of the trial court to find upon all
matenal _1ssues raised by the pleadings and the failure
to do so 1s reversible error. Mitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah,
346, 81 P. 165; Everett v. Jones, 32 Utah, 489, 91 P.
360; Dillon Imp. Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah, 1, 88 P.
670; Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah, 242, 137 P. 937; Snyder
v. Allen, 51 Utah, 291, 169 P. 945; Hillyard v. Dist.
Court (Utah) 249 P. 806."
It is, of course, elementary that parties may contract respecting the right of one to enter upon the land of another
and to drill wells thereon. The right may be made conditional
as in this case, and upon the happening of a specified condition the right of entry and use may, by the terms of the contract
be revoked. Upon the failure of the Irrigation Company to
comply with the contract, the right of the Company to operate
the wells ceased, and the Andrews were entitled to the capping
of the wells. The Andrews had a clear right by contract to
close the wells. It was the plain duty of the trial court to
recognize and to enforce the 195 3 contract.
2. THE IRRIGATION COMPANY HAD THE BUR-

DEN OF PROOF OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH ANDREWS WELLS.
The trial court took the position throughout the trial of
this case that the Andrews could not prevail unless they proved
that the operation of the Irrigation Company flowing wells
had caused interference "' ith the Andre\vs \veils and spring,
and bou' JJ/Itcb interference. The court's position is n1ade clear
18
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t

in this regard by finding of fact No. 15 to the effect that

~·:

Andrews had failed to sustain the burden of proof rrto show
the net effect of the interference caused to his flowing wells
and spring by the Irrigation Company ... " The Court made
the finding despite the facts:
1. The Irrigation Company was the plaintiff, and, there-

fore, normally had the burden of proof, and
2. The priorities of the Andrews spring and wells were

admittedly earlier than the priorities of the Irrigation Company wells.
The situation of the Irrigation Company, the later appropriator from the underground basin, was precisely the same
as one who attempts to develop a water source near an appropriated stream or spring. The Irrigation Company had the
burden of proof that it was not taking water belonging to
the prior appropriators. For a discussion of this well-settled
principle, see Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 P. 1092.
In that case Nebeker had a right to the use of the water of a
certain spring area. Bastian later drilled wells in the vicinity
of the springs, which reduced the flow of water from the springs
and the question arose as to the extent of interference. Bastian
brought suit against Nebeker to enjoin him from interfering
with the wells. The trial court made a finding that 84 7-8 per
cent was ((new water'' developed by the wells, and decreed
the water accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed the case
pointing out that Nebeker had the burden of proof as to the
extent of interference. We quote:
"It is settled law in this jurisdiction that where a
party goes upon a stream at or near its source, the
19
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waters of which have been appropriated and are being
used by others for b,enefi.cia~ purposes, and intercepts
or taps a subterranean flow or body of water and diverts
any substantial flow therefrom which he claims to be
de~eloped water, the burden is upon him to show by
s~tlsfactor.Y proof that the water so intercepted and
dtverted 1s (developed water.' Mountain Lake Min.
Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 47 Utah 346, 149 Pac. 929.
And where, as in the case at bar, it is shown by indisputable evidence that the water claimed to be developed
water is drawn from the same underground flow or
bo_dy of water that wholly or partially feeds and supphes the springs from which the prior appropriator
obtains his water, the subsequent appropriator, the
party claiming to have developed water, should be required to show by clear, positive, and convincing evidence that the water claimed by him is developed water.
Mountain Lake Min. Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., supra,
and cases there cited.' "
The Court then made the following significant comments:
CCThe evidence in this case, as the record now stands,
regarding the effect that a continuous and uninterrupted flow of the wells would eventually have upon
the flow of water from the springs is, as stated, a
matter for conjecture and theory only. The plaintiff,
therefore, did not support his claim that 84 Ys per
cent. of the \Vater flowing from the wells is, as found
by the court, developed '\Yater, by that quantum of ev~
dence required in cases of this kind. The proof on thts
point, as the record nO\Y stands, furnishes ~s sound
a basis for concluding that a continuous, ununpeded
flow of water fron1 the \Yells, for a considerable period
of tin1e, would materially reduce the flow of the springs
below the lowest point shown by the measurements
made by Anderson, if it did not entirely dry up the
springs, as it does for concluding that it \YOuld not
reduce the flow of the spring \Vater belo\Y \Yhat it ·was
20
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when the measurements were made. The court therefore erred in making the finding of fact last referred to.
The trial court, by appointing some person, familiar
with the rules for measuring water, to measure the
water flowing from the spring and seeps at intervals
for a reasonable length of time while the wells are
plugged and then make measurements at intervals
for a considerable length of time when the wells are
flowing at their full capacity, ought to be able to determine approximately the amount of developed water, if
any, that flows from the wells. Should the trial court on
retrying the case make an order that further measurements and tests be made to determine the amount of
developed water, if any, produced by the wells, the
entire expense of such measurements and tests should
be borne by the plaintiff, because, as stated, the burden
is on him to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the water claimed by him is developed water.''
We have quoted at length from the Bastian case because
it is so closely in point on the facts. In that case, as in our case,
the well owner brought the suit for an injunction and had
a later priority than the spring owner. It was also clear in
that case, as in ours, that when the wells were flowing they
interfered with the flow of water from the spring. The Supreme
Court recognized that in cases of this nature where the facts
as to the water supply and extent of interference are difficult
and expensive to ascertain, the burden of proof and all expense
of ascertainment should be on the late comer. The trial court
erred in departing from this sound and well-settled rule.
3. TI-IE IRRIGATION COMPANY WELLS DRILLED
IN 1954 CAUSED THE INTERFERENCE.
The trial court's finding No. 15 that the Andrews had
failed to sustain the burden of proof to show the net effect of
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the interference to his flowing wells caused by the Irrigation
Company as opposed to; and distinguished from the effect
caused by his own pump well; and that Andrews has failed to
show any "measurable interference" between the Irrigation
Company wells and his pump well is not supported by the
evidence. On the contrary, the evidence shows that until the
three wells were drilled by the Irrigation Company in 1954,
and were allowed to flow uncontrolled during the fall and
winter of 1954-195 5 there had been no interference with the
Roundy (Andrews) and Fowkes springs and wells (R. 122123).
The undisputed evidence is that the flowing wells of the
Andrews and Fowkes showed no noticeable decrease in flow
after the drilling of the first two Irrigation Company wells
in 1951, and until Wells 3, 4, and 5 were drilled in 1954
(R. 245-247)

o

This was the case despite the fact that the Andrews pump
well was operated as follows:
1951

1952
1953
1954

1Y2

months (R. 245-246)
3 months (Ro 245-246).
3 months (Trans. 10-3-56, p. 103).
From May to November (Trans. 10-3-56, p. 103)
o

In fact, Mr. Roundy testified that during the summer of
1953, when Irrigation Company wells Nos. 1 and 2 were flow-

ing and the Andrews pump well had been in operation for
three months, the Andrews spring near the house increased
its flow to the extent that he had to release water from his
pond about twice as frequently as before (R. 246). The flow22
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ing wells also increased their flow. He irrigated 150 acres of
land from the spring and flow wells above the tracks, and
about 90· acres below the tracks were subbed and irrigated
from seeps and springs in the lower pasture (R. 247).
The Irrigation Company well No. 3 was completed on
August 15, 1954, and wells Nos. 4 and 5 were completed in
December, 1954. The effect on the Andrews spring near the
house and on the Andrews flowing wells was immediate! y
noticeable (R. 249). All of the Andrews flowing wells ceased
to flou; in 1955 before Andrews pump well was operated.
Andrews pumped on July 23, 1955 (R. 263-264). Pumping
continued until October, 195 5, when the pump was turned off
for the winter. Mr. Mayo testified that on October 3rd, 1955,
none of the Andrews wells were flowing, and nevertheless the
Irrigation Company wells were left open during the winter
season (Tr. 10-3-56, p. 48). The Andrews wells have not
flowed since the last ones dried up in the spring of 195 5 (R.
265). The spring dried up in July, 195 5, and has never come
back (R. 267). In the winter of 1954-5 5 spring and early
sun1mer of 195 5 when the spring and wells stopped flowing,
the Andrews pump well was not in operation, and the Irrigation Company wells were flowing.
In view of the foregoing, it is manifest that the trial
court's finding that the Andrews had failed to show the ((net
effect" of the interference caused to the flowing wells and the
pump well by the Irrigation Company wells, is not supported
by the evidence. The "net effect" of the flowing of the Irrigation Company wells was to dry up the Andre\vs spring and
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flowing wells and to lower the water in the pump well fro1:ll
68 to 83 feet (R. 275).

Andrews vs. Irrigation Company, No. 3768)
1. THE COURT FAILED TO MAkE FINDINGS ON THE

ONLY MATERIAL ISSUE IN THE CASE.
This is an action to review the decision of the state engineer approving Application No. a-2786 filed by the Irrigation
Company for permanent change of point of diversion, place
and nature of use of water. The application was intended to
amend the Irrigation Company application No. 22760 (which
as stated above was filed to appropriate 1.8 second feet of
water from three wells) to permit the diversion of water by
means of five wells. The relative locations of the Andrews
wells and the Irrigation Company wells are shown on the map,
Plaintiffs Exhibit B in Case No. 3763. It will be noted from
Exhibit B that the Irrigation Company wells Nos. 3 and 4,
drilled in August and December 1954, are located approximately one-half mile west of the Andrews group of flowing
wells and a little less than one mile westerly from the Andrews
pump well. It should also be noted that well No. 3 which on
October 3, 195 5 .flowed 1125 gallons per minute was actually
drilled about one-half mile south of the point described in
the change application.
It is alleged in the complaint that since the drilling and
operation of the five Irrigation Company \Yells covered by the
change application the underground basin supplying the
Andrews wells has been substantially lowered, the pressure of
water therein has dropped, the Andrews flowing wells have
24
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ceased to flow, the water in the pump well has been lowered
to a depth in excess of 100 feet, the Andrews springs and seeps
have ceased to flow and the Andrews lands previously subirrigated are now dry. It is further alleged that the approval
of change application ((will impair and destroy plaintiffs' prior

underground water right and will constitute an enlargement of
the defendants' rights.
The law is well settled that in an action such as this, to
review a decision of the state engineer on a change application,
the only issue is whether there is reason to believe that the
proposed change can be made without impairing the vested
rights of other appropriators from the same source. See United
States v. District Court, 121 U. 1, 238 P. 2d 1132; Salt Lake
City v. Boundary Springs Water Users' Ass'n., 2 U. 2d. 141,
270 P. 2d 453.

It is recognized that an appropriator's right to change
the point of diversion, place and nature of use is not absolute
or a vested right, but is only conditional since no such change
can be made if the public, or any other appropriator, prior
or subsequent, is adversely affected. United States v. Caldwell,
64 U. 490, 231 P. 434.
It is also settled that a change applicant cannot increase
the amount of water diverted and consumed after he makes his
appropriation by a change of point of diversion or place or
manner of use, and thereby deprive other appropriators from
the same source of water to which they are entitled. East Bench
Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 U. 2d 170, 271 P. 2d 449, 456.
Another corollary to the fundamentals referred to above
25
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is that an applicant seeking a change cannot take more water
from the new point of diversion than there was available at
the old point. Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co.,
104 U. 202, 135 P. 2d 108.
It is clear from the foregoing that the issue of ((reason
to believe'' the change would not impair existing water rights
is the only material issue in this action to review the state
engineer's decision. There is no finding on this issue. The
court completly ignored it. This is reversible error. See Baker
v. Hatch, supra, and other cases on this point cited above.
2. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE CHANGE IMp AIRS VESTED RIGHTS.

The instant case is unique in that the applicant actually
made the proposed changes and operated its wells for a period
of more than one year before the state engineer approved the
change application. In the ordinary case, the applicant and
the state engineer observe the plain provisions of section
73-3-3, U.C.A. 1953, which expressly forbid the making of a
permanent change of point of diversion without approval of
a change application. In fact, any person who changes, or
who attempts to change, such rights without approval is guilty
of a misdemeanor. But in this case, for some reason not appearing in the record, the Irrigation Company made the change
before approval of its application.
In the ordinary case, the state engineer and the Court, in
case of appeal, are obliged to speculate to some extent on
the effect of the proposed change and to determine whether
there is "reason to believep or \Cprobable cause to believe,"
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that the \Vater can be diverted at the new point of diversion
without impairing the rights of others. In this case, the evidence
is conclusive that the flowing of the three wells drilled in 1954
caused the Andrews spring and flowing wells to cease flowing
during the winter of 1954-1955, and the spring and early
summer of 195 5, before the operation of the Andrews pump
well began (July 23, 1955, see R. 249-264). The reason the
t\vo vvells drilled in 1951 by the Irrigation Company did not
adversely affect the Andrews springs and wells, and the wells
drilled in 1954 at the new point of diversion did affect them,
is apparent from a study of the testimony of David I. Gardner
and George H. Hanson, and from the maps in evidence. Wells
Nos. 3 and 4 are nearer the mountains than the original wells,
they are in coarser water bearing material and they are closer
to the Andrews springs and wells. See (R. 40, 162, 170-175)
for testimony supporting the above assertion. The applicant
made the change application for the obvious purpose of increasing the flow from the basin. The equally obvious result
was that the increased withdrawal of water lowered the water
table and pressure, and dried up the springs and wells having
earlier priorities. In order to hold that there has been no impairment,t his Court would have to hold either ( 1) that the
Andrews had no vested water rights in the springs or flowing
wells or ( 2) that the drilling and operation of the three wells
at the new points of diversion was not a cause of the drying
up of the Andrews springs and wells.
A holding that the Andrews had no vested right in the
flow of springs and wells could not be made without overturning the fundamental water law of the state. All water
27
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sources are, at some point in their development, either springs
or seeps in the case of surface streams or are underground
water, either flowing freely or under pressure. It was stipulated
that the Andrews' predecessors had used the waters of the
springs for irrigation since prior to 1903 (R. 118). No questions of title to the water rights are involved.
As pointed out elsewhere in this brief, the cause of the
drying up of the springs and wells is certain. The three Irrigation Company wells were drilled and allowed to flow
throughout the winter of 1954-1955 when the Andrews pump
well was not operated. The spring and wells started drying
up in January and February and all Andrews springs and
flowing wells were dry before the operation of the pump well
began. The only change in the area was the winter flowing of
the Irrigation Company wells; and, it is, therefore, reasonable
to assume that the change was at least a cause of the interference. These facts would require a finding of impairment
of existing rights and rejection of Application No. a-2786.
The state engineer should be directed by this Court to reject
the application.
Fowkes v. Current Ct·eek Ir,-igation Conzpany, et al., No. 3770

The following points have been discussed in connection
with the other two cases, and such discussion is incorporated
by reference in our argument in this case.
1. The Court ignored Andrews legal rights established

by contract.
3. The burden \vas on the Irrigation Cotnpany to show
28
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that its wells did not dry up the springs and wells of the prior
users.
4. The Court erred in making finding No. 15 that the
Irrigation Company wells have not measureably interfered
with the Andrews springs and wells.
The remaining points will be discussed in the order stated.
2. THE COURT DISREGARDED THE

ANDREWS
PRIORITY AND IN TIME OF SHORTAGE REFUSED TO
ORDER THE IRRIGATION COMPANY WELLS CLOSED.
It should take no argument to demonstrate that the appropriative doctrine applies to all of the waters of the state, surface
and underground, including the underground water in the
vicinity of the Starr Ranch in Juab County. But the trial court
in this case seemed to think that the only application of the
doctrine was to the Fowkes wells and springs. Although no
distinction in priority was made between the Andrews springs
and wells and the Fowkes springs and wells, relief was granted
to Fowkes and denied to Andrews. In effect, the court held
there were only two priorities involved:
First-Fowkes
Second-All others
The court ordered replacement of water at the surface
of the Fovv-kes wells and at their springs, but made no order
whatever respecting the replacement of water in the Andrews
springs and wells. For all intents and purposes, the priorities
of the Andrews and the Irrigation Company were the same
in the eyes of the court. The fundamentals of the water law
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respecting pr1or1ty and administration of water rights were
completley disregarded in the Amended Decree.
Section 73-1-1 Utah Code, 1953, provides:
Waters declared property of public. - All waters
in this state, whether above or under the ground are
?ereby declared to be the property of the public, subJect to all existing rights to to the use thereof.
This Court held in the cases of W rathall v. Johnson, 86
Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755; Justeson v. Olson, 86 Utah 158, 40 P.
2d 802, and Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.
2d 255, that the doctrine of appropriation is applicable to
underground water as well as to surface water. Extensive
amendments to the water laws of Utah have been made since
the decisions in the Wrathall and Justeson cases to adapt them
to underground water, and several important sections have been
added relating only to underground water.
Attention is invited to the following provisions of section 73-5-1 and section 73-5-3.
73-5-1 . . . In addition to the power granted the
state engineer to appoint water commissioners for the
distribution of water as provided herein, the state engineer is hereby authorized upon his own motion at any
time to hold a hearing, or upon a petition signed by
not less than one-third of the users of underground
waters in any area as shall be defined by the state
engineer, he shall hold such hearing, to determine
whether the underground water supply within such
area is adequate for the existing claims. Notice of su~
hearing shall be given in a form and manner which m
the judgment of the state engineer will best suit local
conditions. Upon such hearing the state engineer is
authorized to make full investigation and findings
jO
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thereon. If it be found the water supply is inadequate
for existing claims, he shall divide, or cause to ~e
divided, by the water commissioner or water commissioners as provided in this section, the waters within
such area among the several claimants entitled thereto
in accordance with the rights of each respectively.
73-5-3-Control by engineer of division and distribution under judgments.-The state engineer and his duly
authorized assistants shall carry into effect the judgments of the courts in relation to the division, distribution or use of water under the provisions of this
title. The state engineer shall divide, or cause to be
divided, the water within any district created under
the provisions of this title among the several appropriators entitled thereto in accordance with the right
of each respectively, and shall regulate and control,
or cause to be regulated and controlled, the use of
such water by such closing or partial closing of the
head gates, caps, valves or other controlling works of
any ditch, canal, pipe, flume, well or tunnel or other
means of diversion as will prevent the waste of water
or its use in excess of the quantity to which any appropriator is lawfully entitled, and shall regulate, or cause to
be regulated, the controlling works of reservoirs in accordance with the provisions of this title. . . .
The elementary rule applicable to surface water is that
when there is not sufficient water in a stream to supply all
rights, the rights will be cut off in the inverse order of priority.
This principle is stated in section 73-3-21 as follows:
Appropriators shall have priority among themselves
according to the dates of their respective appropriations, so that each appropriator shall be entitled to
receive his whole supply before any subsequent appropriator shall have any right ...
This statute is applicable to underground water as well
31
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as to surface water, and if there is not enough water for all
rights on a source the last priority must be cut. If there is still
not enough water, the next priority shall be cut, and so forth
until the prior rights receive a full supply. There is no question
but that the law must be followed in this as well as in other
cases. The obvious difficulty with underground water cases
is that there must be a showing as to the quantity of water
available, to determine when and if rights should be cut. This
is easy in the case of surface water. It can be measured. There
are only two approaches to determine whether withdrawals
of underground water are within the annual recharge, or will
result in Hmining" the supply. One is a study of the effect
on the water table of measured withdrawals, and the other is
to theorize. If the first approach is applied to this case it is
apparent that the steady lowering of the water table indicates
that with the year around operation of the Irrigation Company flowing wells the outgo exceeds the annual recharge.
The evidence available indicates, however, that with the
pumping of the Andrews well in the summer, and even with
the Irrigation Company wells Nos. 1 and 2 running continuously from 1951 to 1954, there was no noticeable impairment
of the rights prior in time to the Irrigation Company rights.
This evidence is undisputed in the record. It was not until
the last three Irrigation Company wells were allowed to run
through the winter of 1954-1955 that the Andrews and Fowkes
wells ceased to flow.
A study of the engineering data in this case, and particularly of the hydrographs, exhibits 5 and PS, indicate that
with the Irrigation Company wells flowing the year around, the
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withdrawals were exceeding the annual recharge and under
the statute the court should have ordered priorities shut off in
inverse order until a balance occurred.
Exhibit 5 shows the pressure of the Fowkes well No. 3099
from 1936 to 1955. After the drilling of the Irrigation Company wells, the pressure has been as follows:
December
December
December
October

1952-11lf2
1953- 8!6
1954- 21;2·
1955- 31.Q

feet
feet
feet
feet

above
above
below
below

measuring
measuring
measuring
measuring

point
point
point
point

Exhibit 8 shows depth to water in Andrews well No.

10639.
December 15, 1955-2lf2
April 15, 1956
-21f2
-5
June 10, 1956
August 30, 1956 -8

feet
feet
feet
feet

below
below
below
below

measuring
measuring
measuring
measuring

point
point
point
point

All of the hydrographs in evidence shows that with the
year around draft, resulting from the uncontrolled flow of
the Irrigation Company wells, there is no ((build up" of the
basin at any time of the year. During the ordinary ((recharge
period" in the late fall, winter and early spring when no
water was being used for irrigation there was no ((build up"
(Tr. 10-3-56, pp. 49-54). The water was draining out into
Mona Reservoir, there to be largely lost by evaporation. This
indicates that the Irrigation Company wells ((mined" water
from the basin. If the court had been following the fundamentals of the appropriative doctrine, the decree would have
directed the cutting of later priorities in inverse order to the
extent necessary to keep withdrawals within the annual recharge.
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There is an absolute necessity in this case that there be a
continued study of the underground water basin, and that
orders be made by the state engineer from time to time to
conserve water and to protect the rights of the prior appropriator. This has been standard practice for more than half a
century on surface streams where fluctuating flows require day
to day measurements to assure orderly distribution, and it is
no less a necessity on an underground basin where fluctuations
are just as important and the facts are more difficult to ascertain. There must be flexibility in control just as in the case
of surface water. Thus far the studies of the basin do not
indicate any stability, and there is no likelihood that any
permanent order as to use would settle matters for all time.
As indicated above, withdrawals should not exceed the
annual recharge. No one knows, as yet, what that is, and as
indicated by Dr. Hanson and Mr. Mayo it will take further
study to find out. If excessive water withdrawals are permitted, the elevation of ground water will drop year after
year until the water rights and in fact the farms are destroyed.
The theory (and it is pure theory) discussed by Justice Latimer
in the case of Hanson v. Salt Lake Gty, supra, that a basin
should be developed by dra\ving water to the limit of {(economic lift" is unsow1d and contrary to law. It u·ould permit
late conJers to rr nzine" a block of u·ater only once_. and unless
withdrawals are reduced to a point below the annual recharge
the basin will never recover. The net result will be that the
water in the ground \Yhich permitted artesian flow, and reasonable pu1np lifts '"ill be gone and the property rights of the
owners of prior rights will be destroyed.

34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5. THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING TESTIMONY
SHOWING THAT MORE THAN 50% OF ALL OF THE
WATER WITHDRAWN BY THE IRRIGATION COM-

PANY WELLS WOULD BE WASTED.
David I. Gardner, a civil engineer, testified at length as to
evaporation from the Mona Reservoir and canal losses in
getting the stored water to the place of use. Mr. Gardner
concluded that approximately 7% of the water withdrawn
from the underground basin would be lost by evaporation in
transit to the reservoir; about 25% would be lost in the reservoir; and about 20% would be lost in the canal from the
reservoir to the place of use (R. 57-62) . Evidence was introduced to show that the use of the Irrigation Company wells
was so wasteful, that it should not be permitted, where the
result was to take it from others who suffered no such loss.
Water pumped by the Andrews, and obtained by the Andrews
and Fowkes from flowing wells and springs, is virtually used
without waste. There is no evaporation from the underground
basin and there is no transportation loss in getting the water
from the Andrews wells and springs. They are right on the
farm land.
Upon objection to Mr. Gardner's testimony relating to
evaporation and transit losses, the court ordered it stricken.
We think that in any water adjudication the wastefulness of
the use of water is always material; especially in such cases as
this where the last comer opens the spigot in the basin at the
lowest point and drains the water out for an irrigation use
which wastes more than 50% of the water. The court's ruling
that as long as there was water in the basin, the wastefulness
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of any use was immaterial, was erroneous and constituted
reversible. error.
6. THE COURT'S ((SOLUTION" TO THE PROBLEM
PRESENTED WAS ARBITRARY, INCOMPLETE AND
WHOLLY INEFFECTUAL.
The trial court was faced with a problem of vital concern
to the parties which required a practical solution, in accordance
with the law, not only for the present, but for the future as
well. We believe that the amended decree is arbitrary, incomplete and wholly ineffectual.
The decree is arbitrary for several reasons.

( 1) . It singles out the Fowkes rights of the same priority
as the Andrews springs and flowing well rights, and orders
replacement of the Fowkes rights and ignores the Andrews
rights.

( 2). It orders the replacement expenses to be uborne
equally" by the Andrews and the Irrigation Company although
(a) all Andrews rights are prior to the Irrigation Company
rights, (b) there is no finding as to the quantity of water
drawn by each, and (c) there is undisputed evidence in the
record that until the Irrigation Company wells Nos. 3, 4 and
5 were drilled in 1954 and allowed to flow continuously
throughout the winter there \Vas no noticeable interference with
the Fowkes wells.
( 3) . There is no competent evidence supporting the
quantity of \Vater required to be replaced.
( 4) . The Court ignored the fact that other wells withdraw water from the basin.
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The decree is incomplete and ineffectual because it merely
requires the Andrews and the Irrigation Company to pay the
expense of getting the water to the surface at this time, and
ignores the necessity of establishing rights which can be administered by the state engineer or other officer to govern
water withdrawals in the future. If the present amended
decree should be affirmed, there is nothing decided as between
the Andrews and the Irrigation Company which can guide the
state engineer in administering the water of the basin under
the statutes quoted above. The court has overlooked the fact
that each water right is relative, and that in a suit like this,
where a general determination of rights is sought, there must
be a workable plan for administration established. The court
has not told the state engineer when to cut the later priorities
to assure a full water supply for the prior users. Upon paying
the expense of replacement, the later appropriators can continue to (tmine" the basin until it is not feasible to pump the
water from the basin. As indicated above, further study is
required to determine such vital matters as annual recharge
and jurisdiction of the case should be retained until a sound
basis is found for administration of the basin.

CONCLUSION
The Andrews had rights based on contract and the law,
which were entitled to protection in this litigation. To give
such protection, the Irrigation Company wells which opened
a ccspigot" at the bottom of the basin and dried up old springs
and flowing wells must be closed as provided by contract. The
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burden of proof that such wells can be operated without impairment of. the rights of -others was on the latest appropriator
in the area, the Irrigation Company, and it failed to carry that
burden. Any expense of further study should be borne by the
Irrigation Company as directed by this Court in the case of
Bastian v. Nebeker.
We believe that 1n time of shortage, an underground
basin must be administered by cutting off the junior rights
in inverse order of priority. In these cases the trial court completely ignored the statutes on that subject, and refused to
follow the fundamentals of the water law. All three cases must
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. J. SKEEN
CARVEL MATTSSON
Attorneys for the Andrews

38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

